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  The Swedish welfare state is regularly praised (or maligned) as the prototype of publicly 
organized and provided welfare.  No matter how you slice it, the public sector is among the 
largest in the OECD, with public sector spending totalling 54 percent of GDP in 2005; the tax 
levels required to finance these extensive public commitments are similarly high (Statistiska 
centralbyrån 2007: 31).  As in most other advanced industrial countries, pensions and health care 
are the two largest categories in the public budget, and governments have faced strong economic 
and political pressures to reform both programs.  The public pension and health care systems 
have undergone substantial change during the past two decades, but both programs remain firmly 
within the public sector.  However, the role of ‘markets within politics’ has increased 
substantially.   
 Today's reformed pension system is more market-conforming in terms of its actuarial 
fairness than the old ‘ATP’ system it replaced. Indeed, the introduction of the individual pension 
accounts in the new system (the ‘premium reserve’) defies the public-private distinction because 
it represents a quasi-private scheme administered by a public sector agency.  The health care 
sector has experienced a similar set of changes. Internal markets have been introduced, and 
private providers are now permitted to compete with public ones.  Thus the central conclusion of 
this chapter is that public dominance prevails, but the role of markets and other mechanisms 
usually associated with private provision has increased markedly.  Politicians have introduced 
market mechanisms into pensions and health care in order to improve efficiency, cut costs, and 
stave off calls for more radical privatization initiatives. These shifts in the structure and 
financing of pensions and health care have far-reaching implications for the politics associated 
with pensions and health care.  The reformed pension system is designed to function without 
political interference, thus taking much of the politics out of public pension provision (Anderson 
 
 2005). And the further decentralization of health care means that local governments take the heat 
for slow service delivery and increasing out of pocket expenses.  In sum, developments in both 
sectors are marked by the partial retreat of the state--the public pension operates autonomously 
and most health care decision making is in the hands of local government.    
 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE MIX IN HEALTH CARE 
 The Swedish health care system is dominated by public provision. The central 
government provides substantial public funding (from tax revenues) and sets the regulatory 
framework, and the 20 county councils (landsting) administer the system.  The county councils 
are obligated to provide equal access to quality health care for all of their residents, and despite 
central regulation, they have considerable autonomy in their role as health care providers.  Health 
care outcomes are among the best in the world. Life expectancy for women was 82.8 in 2005 and 
78 for men, and infant mortality is very low.1  
 Sweden spends about 9 percent of GDP on health care (Socialstyrelsen 2005: 17), which 
is close to the OECD average.  Health care financing relies on a mix of local taxation, state 
grants, and user charges.  About 70 percent is financed by local taxes, 16 percent by the state, 3 
percent is covered by patient charges, while the remaining 10 percent comes from other sources.2  
About 90 percent of health care costs are publicly financed; the fifth highest level (behind 
Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and the UK) in the OECD in 2004. As 
noted, county councils have much freedom, so it is not uncommon for public hospitals to 
purchase private health care services.  According to OECD data, public health spending in 
Sweden has decreased as a share of GDP by 5 percent between 1990 and 2004.3
 
  Patient fees are comparatively low, although they have risen in recent years.  A doctor's 
visit typically costs SEK 100-150, and there is a small charge per day for hospital stays.  A high 
cost limit (per year) means that no one pays more than SEK 900 per illness per year and SEK 
1800 per year for prescription drugs.  Unlike other national health care systems, patients usually 
do not need a referral to visit a specialist. 
 The Swedish health care system is strongly decentralized. Its current organization dates 
to 1862, when the regional political units called county councils (landsting) were created and 
given the responsibility of operating the hospitals, which had been state-owned since the 
Reformation in the 16th century.  In 1955, national public health insurance was introduced, 
obligating the counties to provide care to all citizens at heavily subsidized cost. Over the 
following decades, the system was gradually transformed into an NHS-type system, financed 
primarily through local income taxes levied by the counties. In this process, most of the 
remaining private providers in the out-patient sector disappeared as their financial conditions 
deteriorated (Immergut 1992). Thus, until very recently, Swedish health care could be described 
as a system of virtually all publicly provided services, managed directly by elected county 
council politicians and their staff of civil servants. Services were available to all citizens, and 
private health insurance in Sweden was rare. Elections to the political assemblies of the 21 
county councils (functioning like regional parliaments) are held every fourth year, on the same 
day as elections to the national parliament and municipal level. Since Sweden is a unitary state, 
the central government retains an overriding political responsibility for the health of the 
population and can adopt national laws governing aspects of the health care system, such as basic 
patient rights or regulations regarding contagious diseases. Through the National Board of 
 
 Health and Social Welfare (Socialstyrelsen), an expert agency, the government can also issue 
guidelines regarding medical practice and evaluate developments at county council level. 
 In recent decades both policy-makers and researchers have been more concerned with the 
governance of the system. This can be attributed both to harsher economic conditions and 
increasing interest in new public management. Reforms implemented during this period have 
generally been oriented towards decentralizing political power within the system and making the 
county councils more autonomous. In the 1970s and 1980s, the national legislation regulating the 
health care tasks of county councils was replaced by so-called discretionary laws, which 
stipulated overriding goals and values of the system, rather than detailed rules. During the 1970s, 
such decentralization reforms were primarily driven by the desire to strengthen the democratic 
character of the system by allowing for more localized decision-making and local community 
involvement.  In the 1980s, the continued decentralization policies in the health care area became 
framed in the ‘management by objectives’ philosophy that had gained influence among Swedish 
policy-makers at the time (Montin 1997). At this point, it was stated that the role of the county 
council politicians should be to set goals for administrators and professionals within the system 
but leave its actual management to these groups. This meant a departure from the previous 
emphasis on detailed local planning, while provider units (hospitals, clinics, primary care health 
centers) became more self-governing.  
 In the early 1990s, the economic situation of the counties deteriorated, both because of 
local unemployment (generating less tax revenue) and reductions in central government grants to 
the health care sector (which constitute about 15 percent of total health care expenditure).  The 
need to contain costs reinforced within the counties the existing interest in market-oriented 
organizational reforms. Guided by the ideals of the ‘new public management’ (NPM) movement, 
 
 the counties began to experiment with organizational models that separated purchaser and 
provider functions and allowed for privatization and competition on the provider side (for 
example, Hood 1995). Apart from promoting economic efficiency and cost awareness, a stated 
objective behind these NPM reforms was to strengthen the role of the political representatives 
within the system. These reforms were made possible by changes in national legislation that 
removed some of the remaining barriers to fully independent health care provision at county 
council level by making it legal, for the first time, for the county councils to contract out the 
provision of services to private, including for-profit, actors.  By the end of the 1990s, a majority 
of the county councils had introduced purchaser/provider splits and private contracting practices. 
The 1990s also saw a reinforced political emphasis on the rights of patients, both at the national 
political level and among the county councils themselves (Department of Social Affairs 1999).   
 During the 1980s and 1990s political and administrative power within this system were 
further decentralized. In recent years, waiting lines and poor coordination between different 
health providers have led to a critical debate about the functioning of the system and the 
performance of the county councils. Since the late 1990s, the government has made some 
attempts to strengthen its control over the system, but, so far, these efforts do not appear to have 
been very successful. In addition, some observers believe that the country councils are too small 
to provide efficiently all types of specialized care within their geographical areas.4 As a result, 
Swedish health care today is characterized by ongoing discussions about the future of the country 
councils and their degree of independence from the central government. 
 The key political decision-making bodies within the Swedish health care system are the 
county councils, as they provide over 90 percent of all services. The small share of health care 
provided by non-public actors (about 9 percent) is typically regulated and, to an overwhelming 
 degree, financed by the county councils as well. The county councils are also the employers of 
most health care personnel in Sweden, including the vast majority of doctors. Although the 
central government formally retains political responsibility for ensuring that health services are 
available to all citizens, the actual task of providing the services (including dental care) has been 
delegated to the county councils.  
 The most important national legislation underpinning the system is the Health and 
Medical Services Act of 1982. This Act is framework legislation so it sets out general objectives 
and does not regulate the system in detail. Thus it gives the county councils much freedom in 
organizing the provision of services.  The county councils enjoy considerable financial autonomy 
from the central government as well because they have the right to levy local taxes.  Central 
government block grants make up about 20 percent of the system’s total finances. 
 In 1991, the Local Government Act further extended the already substantive political 
autonomy of the county councils by removing existing regulations regarding their internal 
organization and giving them the right to contract out service provision to non-public actors, 
including profit-making enterprises (Montin 1992). This led to locally-initiated reforms in many 
county councils, the most common of which was the division of purchasing and provision and 
the expansion of patient choice. Local reforms during the second half of the 1990s often also 
included elements of decentralization, like making provider units more organizationally 
independent or delegating the purchasing of services to local boards (Anell 1996). During the 
same period, responsibility for long-term and home-based health care, and later out-patient 
psychiatric services, were transferred from the county councils to the 290 municipalities who are 
traditionally the providers of social services for the elderly and handicapped.  This added a new 
 set of actors to the health care system, whose jurisdictions and responsibilities are not always 
clearly separated from those of the county councils. 
 The main role of the central government in the highly decentralized Swedish system is to 
formulate the overriding political goals and values guiding it. The government can also propose 
more detailed regulations regarding matters of national interest, for instance patient rights or 
contagious disease prevention. The government supervises the system through its expert agency, 
the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen). Among the tasks of the Board is to 
collect data from the county councils to monitor their performance, evaluate policy outcomes and 
provide treatment guidelines and other kinds of medical information to health care providers.  
 It should be noted, furthermore, that in practice health policy in Sweden is often 
formulated through largely informal contacts between the main actors of the system, that is, the 
government (represented by the Ministry of Social Affairs), the Board of Health and Welfare and 
the organization representing the county councils at the central level, and the National Federation 
of County Councils (Landstingsförbundet). The predominantly cooperative and consensual 
nature of these relations may at least in part be attributed to the dominant position of the Social 
Democratic Party in post-war Swedish politics, which resulted in Social Democratic governance 
at the central, regional and local political levels during most of this period.  
 A prominent goal behind the far-reaching decentralization of political power to the 
county councils in the 1980s and 1990s was to strengthen the democratic character of the health 
care system. Reformers sought to bring the decision-making process within the system closer to 
the population and create new opportunities for active community involvement. Above all, it was 
hoped that their democratic accountability would be enhanced. Free choice of care provider in 
combination with a ‘money follows the patient’ system of reimbursement was another reform 
 measure employed to empower health consumers and democratize the system further (Blomqvist 
2002). 
 Did these reforms have the intended effects? Reform outcomes have generally been hard 
to measure, given the plurality and vagueness of the stated goals (which were also related to the 
value of economic efficiency), but evaluations point to that community involvement in health 
policy-making has reached state goals in at least some communities. Patient organizations appear 
to have become more actively involved in trying to influence processes of local health services 
purchasing. Other examples of community involvement include participation in health policy 
study groups and meetings with county council politicians (Bergman and Dahlbäck 2000). The 
introduction of health services purchasing has also led to more active attempts on part of policy 
makers to establish local medical needs and preferences, for instance through public surveys. In 
some county councils, like Östergötland, there have also been moderately successful attempts to 
involve the local community in priority-setting, for instance through polls and discussion groups 
(Garpenby 2002). Among providers, the introduction of patient choice and performance-related 
payments has stimulated a new interest in measuring and evaluating patient satisfaction.  
 Patient choice of provider is probably the one reform measure that has received the most 
public attention. Patients now enjoy the right to choose their provider freely, both at primary and 
secondary care levels and across county borders. So far, patient flows between county councils 
remain marginal, however, and there is some indication that bureaucratic obstacles prevail when 
people seek care outside the previous ‘catchment areas’ of, for instance, individual hospitals. 
Recent research indicates that another reason for persistent low patient mobility may be related 
to the attitudes of medical professionals, whose role in informing patients about their right to 
 provider choice for further treatment is crucial for implementing this part of the reform 
(Windblad-Spångberg 2003). 
 Whether political accountability within the system has increased as a result of the 
decentralization reforms is hard to determine as well. There are some indications that local 
politicians have become more directly involved in the planning and purchasing of health 
services, thus ‘taking back’ some power from the civil servants (Bergman and Dahlbäck 2000). 
Political accountability within the system may also have been enhanced by a different factor:  
increased media attention to health care issues in recent years.  This has resulted in local 
politicians being exposed to a greater level of public scrutiny. At the same time, the organization 
of health care provision has become more complex since the introduction of contracting and 
more ‘market-like’ relations between actors within the system. The increasingly complex web of 
contracts between the county councils and a multitude of different providers tend to create 
diffuse lines of accountability and make the system less transparent. This problem is further 
complicated by the recent transferral of responsibility for long term care and out-patient 
psychiatric services from the county councils to the municipalities, a change that sometimes has 
left patients confused about who is responsible for providing various services. 
 At present, questions of central-local relations and responsibility for various health 
services are highly salient in Swedish politics. As stated above, the government has attempted 
recently to reassert its influence over developments within the system, both through legislation 
and negotiated agreements with the county councils. Evaluations of these efforts demonstrate, 
however, that governmental attempts to influence policy priorities often fail (National Board of 
Health and Welfare 2004). Partly in response to what has come to be regarded as an overly 
complex system, with overlapping lines of jurisdiction between different public bodies, the 
 government appointed in 2003 an investigative committee to review the overall structure of and 
division of responsibilities within the health care system (Ministry of Finance 2003).5  Since 
then, several political interest groups, including the conservative (Moderaterna) and liberal 
(Folkpartiet) parties, the Swedish Medical Association, (Sveriges läkarförbund) and the main 
union federation, the LO (Landsorganisationen) have openly advocated the abolition of the 
county councils. These recent political developments illustrate the fact that power struggles 
within the nearly all-public Swedish health care system often have constituted themselves along 
the lines of central-local relations.  
 Whether the market-orienting reforms and the decentralization of powers to the county 
councils have actually strengthened the political governance of the Swedish health care system 
remains unclear. That the county councils have become more autonomous vis-à-vis the national 
government during this period is obvious, which can be said to have reinforced the local 
democratic character of the system. By the same token, regional variation within the system has 
increased significantly, making broad characterizations of developments within it increasingly 
difficult. The few post-reform evaluations of the democratic governance of the system show that 
efforts have indeed been made in many counties to involve local communities in decisions 
regarding purchasing priorities.  However, it has been difficult to create the kinds of institutions 
that would promote the required level of citizen-politician interaction for this (Bergman and 
Dahlbäck 2000; Garpenby 2001; Petterson 1998).  In many counties, the ‘purchaser side’ has 
often been too weak to bargain effectively with providers, and the politicians have tended to lose 
influence to civil servants and professionals in the often complicated and technical negotiations 
that purchasing of health services entail. A further complicating factor for democratic 
governance within the system is increased provider choice available to patients.  This can be said 
 to strengthen the system's democratic character, but it also makes priority-setting and planning 
within the system more difficult.  
 It is clear that the increased autonomy of the county councils in recent years has resulted 
in attempts by national authorities to regain some control over the system. For example, the 
central government passed legislation to prohibit the sale of hospitals to for-profit firms in 2002, 
formulated national guidelines for prescribing drugs and choosing treatment methods, and 
adopted a new, national ‘action plan’ (nationella handlingsplanen) in 2001 to promote 
governmental (Social Democratic) health priorities. The emerging power struggle between 
regional and national levels of government has been reinforced by local party politics.  Many 
county councils are governed by different parties than those in the national government (this 
phenomena is explained by voters ‘splitting their ticket’ between the national and county council 
elections, which has become more common).   
 At the same time, the continued need for cost containment and rationalization in the 
health care system has made local policy choices more controversial and exposed county council 
politicians to public discontent, in some cases even death threats. This is especially the case 
when hospital closings are announced. Dissatisfaction with the county council political 
leadership in many regions, not least among medical professionals, has fueled demands that the 
county councils be reorganized or even abolished. Other critics have argued that the county 
councils are too small to plan health care provision effectively; or that out-patient care should be 
localized even further and transferred to the municipal level. Hence, at this time, the future of the 
county councils is uncertain and structural reforms reformulating their tasks cannot be ruled out. 
  The emphasis on further decentralization within the already decentralized Swedish health 
care system over the last two decades has reinforced the tradition of local democratic 
 governance.  At the same time, however, this trend has exposed the system to far-reaching 
changes initiated by local reformers. Continuing budget constraints in many county councils also 
means that local policy-makers will have to continue to search for new ways to contain 
expenditure.  This makes it likely that regional differences within the system will increase 
further, as political priorities come to reflect differing regional circumstances and value 
orientations.  
 Despite productivity gains, waiting lists continue to plague the system.  In 2005 the 
Social Democratic government and the county councils introduced a ‘care guarantee’ setting the 
maximum wait at three months.6  The ongoing process of European integration has added an 
international dimension to the issue of timely access to care.  A recent decision by the European 
Court of Justice confirms patients' rights to seek treatment abroad, and this has potentially far-
reaching implications for the Swedish health care system.   
 
 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE MIX IN PENSIONS 
Historical Background 
 Sweden was one of the first countries to legislate a universal public pension.  Before the 
breakthrough of full parliamentary democracy in 1921, Liberal groups in the two-chamber 
Riksdag vied for control of the ‘social question’ with influential farmers and the nascent Social 
Democratic Party.  Farmers' opposition to Bismarckian-style social insurance delayed the 
introduction of public pensions until 1913, when the government led by Liberal Prime Minister 
Karl Staaff introduced a universal old age and invalidity pension scheme in 1913.  The design of 
the new scheme satisfied agricultural and labor interests, and passed easily.7  The 1913 Law 
 provided for a contribution-based pension (avgiftspension). Invalids were eligible for a means-
tested supplement (pensionstillägg). Total pensions were low, and in 1935 this ‘premium reserve 
system’ (premiereservsystemet) was replaced by the flat rate basic pension (folkpension; Elmér 
1960: 50-51, 66ff).  By the end of World War II, the Social Democrats had become of the 
dominant party in the Riksdag, and the party soon embarked on its so-called ‘Harvest Period’ 
during which the major programs of the postwar welfare state were introduced.  A key 
component of this strategy was a substantial increase in the basic pension so that it covered basic 
living costs. By the early 1950s, the size of the pension equalled about 30 percent of average 
industrial wages (Ackerby 1992). 
With the basic pension firmly in place, political actors turned their attention to earnings-
related pensions in the 1950s, ushering in perhaps the greatest political conflict of the postwar 
period: the ‘ATP Struggle’ (ATP-striden).  In the 1950s, public employees and white collar 
workers enjoyed generous occupational pensions while the majority of households only had 
access to the basic pension. Metalworkers, later supported by the Trade Union Confederation, 
LO, were the first blue collar group to demand earnings-related pensions on equal terms with 
white collar workers.  With blue collar workers pushing hard for legislation on supplementary 
pensions, the Social Democratic-Farmers coalition government appointed several commissions 
to study the issue, but agreement with the non-socialist parties (backed by employers) was 
elusive.  To break the deadlock, an advisory referendum was held in 1957.  The Social 
Democratic proposal received a plurality, followed by the Liberal-Conservative proposal and the 
Agrarians' proposal.  The Social Democrats went ahead with their proposal, prompting the break-
up of their coalition with the Farmers' Party.  The legislation passed by a razor-thin margin in 
1959 and the Social Democratic government called early elections to consolidate their gains.8
 The new national supplementary pension scheme (ATP, in force since 1960) provided 
earnings-related pensions to all wage-earners, including the self-employed. Collectively 
negotiated white collar pensions were retained, and in 1971 LO members got their own 
collective pensions (Ståhlberg 1993: 13).  A key element of the ATP reform, and the Social 
Democrats' new ‘wage-earner strategy,’ was the inclusion of the white-collar workers in the ATP 
scheme on favorable terms.  ATP's benefit formula was based on the best 15 of 30 years of labor 
market participation, and this was specifically designed to gain white collar workers' support 
(Svensson 1994). 
The ATP was closely integrated with the existing basic pension.  Together with the basic 
pension, a full ATP pension would provide 65 percent of previous income (the best 15 of 30 
years) up to the ATP ceiling (equal to average earnings). According to the generous transition 
rules, the system would approach maturity by the early 1990s. The ATP system also included 
provisions for disability pensions (förtidspensioner) and family pensions (familjpensioner), 
which provided coverage to widows and orphans. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Social Democratic governments, now firmly in control of 
government, improved public pensions with the support of the opposition. In 1969, the pension 
supplement (pensionstillskott) was introduced for those who were not included in ATP or who 
had few ATP points. After a series of increases, the supplement equaled about half of the basic 
pension by the early 1990s.  Between 1970 and 1972, eligibility rules for disability pensions 
were relaxed so that it could also be awarded for so-called labor market reasons.9 In 1974, 
sickness and unemployment insurance were made taxable and eligible for pension points. In 
1976, the pension age was reduced from 67 to 65, and the partial pension (delpension) was 
introduced. Workers aged 60-64 who switched to part-time employment became eligible for the 
 partial pension10 until they reached retirement age. In 1982, the basis for ATP contributions was 
increased to include the entire wage sum even though only incomes up to a specified ceiling 
earned pension points. Since 1982, the care of small children has also been eligible for ATP 
pension points. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, employer contributions to both the basic 
pension and ATP pension system were raised several times. 
 
Prelude to Reform 
In the mid-1970s, welfare state reform reached the political agenda in Sweden as it did in 
many other West European countries.  The oil shocks and the emergence of stagflation rattled the 
foundations of the Swedish welfare state because generous social policy and high tax rates 
presupposed steady economic growth and full employment.  The non-socialist parties governed 
Sweden from 1976-82 but made little progress on welfare state reform.  The Social Democrats 
returned to power in 1982 and promptly started a debate about how to modernize the welfare 
state.  Pension reform was slated to be part of this debate, so the government appointed an 
official commission of inquiry to pinpoint areas in need of reform (SOU 1990: 76).11  Despite 
the participation of major stakeholders (unions, employers, political parties and other experts), 
and nearly ten years of work, the commission could not agree on significant reform proposals.  
The commission's work, however, did set in motion a period of serious debate about the direction 
of reform.  Before the Social Democrats could take any concrete steps, the non-socialist parties 
won the September 1991 election, so the initiative was now in their hands.  The new government 
wasted little time. The Minister of Social Affairs (Liberal Party) recruited the opposition parties 
to negotiate on pension reform.  After several years of deliberations in a closed parliamentary 
working group, the non-socialist coalition government adopted framework legislation in the 
 spring of 1994 with the support of the opposition Social Democrats. 12 The Social Democrats 
returned to office in September 1994, so they presided over the passage of detailed legislation in 
1998.13  The reform has been implemented in steps between 1995 and 2001, and the new system 
was fully operational starting in 2003. 
Briefly, the reformed pension system breaks with the old system in several important 
ways. First, benefits are based on lifetime earnings rather than the best 15 of 30 years of labor 
market participation.  Second, the earnings-related pension includes mandatory individual 
accounts (the ‘premium reserve’). Third, a pension-tested ‘guarantee pensions’ replaces the old 
basic pension. Finally, wage earners pay individual contributions into the system, and the state 
(or relevant social insurance agency) pays contributions for pension credits earned for child-
rearing, military service and spells of sickness, unemployment and disability. 
 The new public pension system consists of three parts: the guaranteed pension 
(garantipension), the income pension (inkomstpension), and the premium pension 
(premiepension).  This system replaced the basic pension (introduced in 1913) and the ATP 
pension (adopted in 1959).14  
The guarantee pension covers residents with insufficient earnings-related benefits. For 
those born before 1938, the old basic pension (folkpension) continued to pay a flat-rate benefit 
until 2003 when it was converted into the ‘transitional guarantee pension.’ Those with income 
from employment (including the self-employed) are covered by the new income pension and the 
premium pension. There is no separate scheme for civil servants or the self-employed. 
 The National Insurance Board (Försäkringskassan) administers the guarantee pension 
and the income pension.15 The Premium Pension Authority (Premiepensionmyndigheten, PPM), 
a state agency, administers the premium pension. The PPM was set up in 1998 to administer 
 contributions to the individual accounts (the premium reserve) and to manage contracts with the 
fund managers whose products are part of the premium pension catalogue.  In 2004 wage earners 
could choose between 600 investment funds, including a public default fund, the Premium 
Savings Fund (Premiesparfonden) for those who do not make an active fund choice.16  
 General revenues finance the guarantee pension, a clear break from previous policy in 
which employers paid an earmarked contribution (6.75 percent of payroll) that covered about 52 
percent of basic pension costs in 1993. This contribution was eliminated in 1998.  Earmarked 
pension contributions finance both the income pension and the premium pension. Of the 18.5 
percent total pension contribution, 16 percentage points are allocated to the income pension and 
2.5 percentage points to the premium pension.  Another novelty in the reformed system is that 
wage-earners pay 7 percent of their eligible earnings up to a ceiling of 8.07 ‘income base 
amounts.’17 In the old system, employers paid the entire contribution.  In 2004 the contribution 
ceiling was SEK 42,300, and it is indexed to increases in average earnings. Employers pay 10.21 
percent contribution to the earnings ceiling, and half of this for earnings above the ceiling. The 
latter is called a ‘tax’ rather than a pension contribution.  
The reformed system breaks with past policy by eliminating unfunded liabilities.  This 
does not necessarily mean that all pension promises are backed up by money in the bank. It does 
mean that all pension rights are backed up by contributions, whether these are paid by wage-
earners, employers, or the state.  General revenues finance the entire contribution for ‘child 
years’18 and those in military service. For claimants of unemployment insurance or sickness 
benefit, the state pays the employer share of the contribution (10.21 percent), and the individual 
pays her contribution as if she were working. In 2002 state payments for those receiving social 
 insurance benefits or those not working were 12 percent of all revenues in the income pension 
scheme (Riksförsäkringsverket 2004:32). 
Like the old system, the new pension system operates largely on a pay-as-you-go basis, 
with ‘buffer’ funds to compensate for economic and demographic shifts.  The scope and function 
of the buffer funds in the new system are much different from that of the old system.19  Under 
the old pension system, the AP20 Funds functioned both as buffer funds and as a source of capital 
for infrastructure such as public housing.  At their peak in the 1980s, assets in the AP Funds 
equalled about 40 percent of GDP, enough to cover pension payments for more than seven years 
without contributions. In the reformed pension system, the buffer funds are smaller and play little 
role in terms of an active investment strategy.  Over time, the assets in the premium reserve will 
exceed those in the AP Funds. 
The introduction of automatic stabilizers is another important and innovative feature of 
the new pension system. The ‘automatic balancing’ mechanism requires the National Insurance 
Office to calculate the notional assets and liabilities of the system every year. Notional assets are 
90 percent of total assets and are the sum of all future pension contributions (16 percent of 
qualifying income).21 AP Fund assets make up the remaining 10 percent of financial assets. 
Notional liabilities are the sum of pension promises to current workers and retirees.  If the ratio 
of assets to liabilities, the balance ratio (balanstal), falls below one, the balancing mechanism is 
activated. Both pension rights and benefit payments are indexed at a lower rate until the system 
returns to balance (Riksförsäkringsverket 2000).22
 All social insurance benefits in Sweden are based on a bookkeeping device called the 
base amount (basbeloppet), which was introduced with the ATP reform in 1959.  In the old 
pension system, there was a single base amount indexed to inflation.  The full ATP pension was 
 equal to 6.5 base amounts, which combined with the flat rate basic pension of 1 base amount, 
added up to a pension of 7.5 base amounts.  This level was approximately equal to average 
wages, at least in the first two decades of the ATP's existence.  The reformed pension system 
breaks with this principle by introducing three kinds of base amount: the ‘price base amount’ 
(prisbasbelopp), the ‘increased price base amount’ (förhöjda prisbasbeloppet), and the ‘income 
base amount’ (inkomstbasbeloppet). The new ‘price base amount’ replaces the old base amount, 
and it is the basis for calculating the guarantee pension and several other social insurance 
benefits. The ‘increased price base amount’ is also indexed to inflation, but when it was 
introduced in 1998 its initial value was set higher than the price base amount. The ‘increased 
price base amount’ is used to calculate supplementary pension rights for those born between 
1938 and 1953 who are covered by the old ATP system and the new pension system. Finally, the 
‘income base amount’ is indexed to increases in pension-carrying income, and is the basis for 
calculating the income ceiling for income pensions (7.5 ‘income base amounts’) as well as the 
notional pension assets (avgiftsunderlag) in the new pension system. In 2006 the price base 
amount is SEK 39,700, the increased price base amount is SEK 40,500, and the income base 
amount is SEK 44,500. 
Residents with insufficient income from the income pension system have the right to the 
guarantee pension starting at 65.23 The guarantee pension replaces the basic pension, pension 
supplement and the special tax deduction for pensioners.  A novel aspect of the guarantee 
pension is that it is taxable (the old basic pension was not). The size of the guarantee depends on 
the level of pension rights in the income pension system, so the amount varies.  In 2006 the 
guaranteed minimum is 2.13 price base amounts, or SEK 86,149 annually. Married pensioners 
receive 1.9 price base amounts (SEK 76,820) each. The premium pension, private pension 
 income and occupational pension income do not affect the level of the guarantee pension. To 
qualify for the maximum benefit, 40 years of residence from age 25 are required. For those who 
do not meet this requirement (usually immigrants), there is a special maintenance allowance. 
Low-income pensioners are also eligible for the pensioners housing supplement (BTP). The 
guarantee pension is payable to those born 1938 or later.24  
One of the most distinctive features of the reformed pension system is that earnings-
related benefits are based on ‘notional defined contributions’ (NDC).  This does not mean that 
pensions are pre-funded and backed up by 100 percent capital coverage as in a true defined 
contribution scheme.  Instead, the income pension scheme emulates a pre-funded defined 
contribution scheme by estimating an internal rate of return for accumulated pension 
contributions. The new system counts lifetime contributions, and the monthly benefit is 
calculated based on (gender-neutral) life expectancy at the time of retirement. The National 
Insurance Office administers individual NDC accounts. The notional balance in individuals’ 
accounts is indexed annually to an ‘income index’ (inkomstindex) based on changes in average 
pension-carrying income for wage-earners aged 16-64. At retirement, an individual's notional 
assets are converted to an annuity using the ‘annuitization divisor’ (delningstal) which is the 
expected remaining life expectancy for an individual's cohort plus an internal rate of return of 1.6 
percent.  The reformed pension system permits flexible retirement, starting at age 61. Thus later 
retirement increases the pension benefit because the divisor decreases and pension assets 
increase. The reverse is true for earlier retirement. The notional assets of those who die before 
retirement are credited to her birth year cohort. Administrative costs are deducted annually. 
Benefit payouts are indexed to the adjustment index (följsamhetsindex) which is the income 
index minus 1.6.25
 Another innovative component of Sweden's reformed pension scheme is the ‘premium 
reserve:’ 2.5 percentage points of the 18.5 percent income pension contribution are placed in a 
defined contribution, individual investment account. Individuals currently choose from about 600 
investment funds.  The PPM, a state agency, administers premium pension accounts and 
manages contracts with investment funds.  All fund balances are annuitized at the time of 
retirement and can be paid out either as a fixed annuity with a minimum rate of return of three 
percent or as a variable annuity. Premium pensions cannot be inherited; and the individual bears 
all investment risk. The premium pension is payable from age 65.26
The reformed pension system is being gradually phased in.  Those born between 1938 
and 1953 receive pensions according to the old and new systems.27 Every person with pension 
rights in Sweden receives an annual pension statement from the National Insurance Office, the 
so-called ‘orange envelope,’ that contains estimates of future pension benefits (for both the 
income pension and premium pension) based on current individual employment and different 
economic growth scenarios. 
Several factors account for the adoption of one of the most radical pension reforms in the 
OECD.  First, Sweden experienced a deep economic crisis in the early 1990s that prompted 
across-the-board cuts in government spending.  Between 1990 and 1993, Sweden went from 
budget surplus to recording a deficit of 12.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).  During 
the same period, open unemployment rose from 1.7 percent to 8.2 percent (Huber and Stephens 
1998; Pontusson 1992).  Second, the historic defeat of the Social Democrats in the 1991 election 
meant that the non-socialist government coalition managed the crucial initial stages of the 
pension reform negotiations. The Social Democrats had already come out in favor of major 
pension reform in their 1990 budget, and the party's opposition role in the Riksdag certainly 
 made it easier to overcome some of the opposition within the party and among blue collar union 
members.  Finally, crucial aspects of the existing policy structure facilitated a strategy of 
‘rationalizing redistribution.’ (Anderson and Meyer 2003).  Specifically, the capital in the AP 
Funds (about 30 percent of GDP in the early 1990s) could be used to finance the transition to the 
new system.  Moreover, reform advocates could credibly claim that the introduction of the 
lifetime earnings benefit formula was more fair than the old 15/30 rule that benefited mainly 
white collar workers. 
The Swedish reform is all the more remarkable when we consider that politicians faced a 
popular, universal, and nearly mature pension system. The ‘lock-in’ effects of pension policy 
development dictated that reform would have to take place within the structure of the existing 
system. The non-socialist parties recognized this, but the large capital reserves in the AP Funds 
provided an opening for fundamental change. The role of the AP Funds in facilitating the 
transition to the new pension system can hardly be exaggerated. By 2004, the AP Funds had 
transferred SEK 350 billion (about € 38 billion) to the government budget to compensate the 
state for increased costs resulting from the reform. This made it possible to devote a larger share 
of contributions (16 percent of qualifying income) to income pensions, (compared to 12 percent 
of qualifying income in the old system) and to devote 2.5 percentage points to the new funded 
accounts. Thus the reform means that more resources flow to earnings-related pensions while the 
state assumes the non-insurance functions of the old pension system (basic security, survivor’s 
pensions, disability pensions). The financial cushion provided by the AP Funds gave reformers a 
degree of maneuvering room that simply does not exist in other public pension systems 
(Anderson and Immergut 2007; Anderson and Meyer 2003).  
 The role of the AP Funds is important for another reason as well. As assets accumulate in 
the new premium reserve, it will eventually replace the AP Funds as a source of investment 
capital. Although this aspect of the reform would not affect the level of benefits, it was a major 
victory for the non-socialist parties because they succeeded in the partial privatization of very 
large publicly controlled pension funds.  Finally, the reform was an opportunity to ‘rationalize 
redistribution’ (Anderson and Meyer 2003; Myles and Pierson 2001) because the existing benefit 
formula (the 15/30 rule) was considered unjust. This feature of the old system was repeatedly 
criticized by reformers, and given the very high levels of female labor force participation, the 
rationale behind the old rules was hard to justify. 
 In sum, retirement provision remains overwhelmingly public, despite the sweeping 
reforms of the 1990s.  Most Swedes' retirement packages rely heavily on public pensions, topped 
up by occupational pensions bargained as part of collective wage agreements.28  Individual 
private pension savings accounts have become more popular in the last decade, but remain fairly 
insignificant in comparison to public and occupational coverage.  Thirty-eight percent of those 
aged 20-64 have individual accounts, with an average value of about SEK 6000 in savings (about 
$800; www.scb.se).  Despite the growing importance of contractual and private provision, the 
public system provides the bulk of retirement income.  Income inequality in retirement is likely 
to increase, however, because future pension income will more closely mirror employment 
income as well as variable investment returns for the premium pension. 29  
  
Comparing the Public-Private Dichotomy in Pensions and Health Care 
 The pace of reform in both health care and public pensions since the early 1990s has been 
dramatic.  Both systems remain firmly within the public sector, but the role of the state has 
 changed substantially.  Internal markets now permeate the health care system, and most decision-
making has been decentralized.  Despite enduring public dominance, the state has retreated in 
favor of local government (health care) and autonomous public agencies administering more or 
less self-sustaining programs (pensions).  These changes mean that the state is less implicated in 
the politics surrounding both programs.  The reformed pension system operates on ‘auto-pilot’ so 
decisions about raising or cutting benefits emerge from the built-in automatic stabilizers.  In 
short, the state makes no promise about the level of future (earnings-related) pension benefits.  
So far, the potentially negative effects of the new system remain untested; benefits have been 
indexed at least as much as they would have been in the old system, and those who 'lose' under 
the new pension system have adequate time to adjust their labor force and savings behavior in 
order to compensate for their losses.  The retreat of the state is similar in health care.  The 
decentralization reforms of the 1990s mean that the county councils face any hard decisions 
about the allocation of resources.  To be sure, the state remains the central financier and 
regulatory player, but county councils have considerable leeway in organizing health care 
delivery. 
 The wave of reforms during the last two decades has redrawn the lines of conflict 
characteristic of both sectors and has led to the emergence of new actors as the state has 
retreated.  The central line of potential conflict in health care is between local government and 
the central state. In pensions, the potential for conflict is much diminished because of the 
automatic features of the new pension system. Notional defined contributions and automatic 
stabilizers mean that if pensions decrease, it is because of economic and demographic trends and 
not because of a specific political decision.  
  Private providers are the main new actors in health care, whereas investment funds have 
entered the world of public pensions because of the introduction of the premium pension.  Assets 
in the premium reserve at the end of 2006 totaled about SEK 230 billion ($30 billion).  In 2007 
wage earners could chose from more than 600 investment funds.  Since the premium pension 
was introduced in 2003, assets have increased in value by 29.2 percent (PPM 2007).  Since all 
wage earners participate in the scheme, all now have a stake in financial markets, even if one 
chooses the state-run default fund for those who do not make an active choice.   
 Swedish membership in the European Union (since 1995) has potentially important 
implications for both health care and pensions policy because of the rules governing the internal 
market.  Recent European Court of Justice rulings establish the right of patients to seek (and be 
reimbursed for) health care outside of their home country.  It is too early to tell what the full 
ramifications of these rulings will be, but the NHS-style health care systems in the EU, including 
Sweden, now face the previously unthinkable prospect of residents seeking care in other EU 
member states in order to avoid waiting lists or to seek treatment not offered at home.  This 
development obviously threatens the sovereignty of national health care systems like Sweden's at 
the same time that it increases the pressure to expand care options and improve access to care. 
 These European developments notwithstanding, national politics will continue to 
dominate pensions and health care.  Both systems--their creation, consolidation, and recent 
reform--have been heavily influenced by the political dominance of the Social Democratic Party.  
The victory of the non-socialist parties30 in the September 2006 election marks the end of more 
than a decade of Social Democratic rule.  It is important to note that the Conservatives remade 
themselves as the ‘party of workers’, signaling their acceptance of public dominance in welfare. 
But the non-socialists want a different kind of public dominance than the Social Democrats.  The 
 toughest reforms have already been adopted, so the current and future issue concerns which 
political block (the non-socialists or the socialists) will dominate the process of further 
consolidation.  Fiscal austerity, at least in the short term, is not a pressing issue because the 
budget is in surplus, and the pension system is now largely self-financing. However, ageing will 
continue to create challenges for both the health care system and the elder care system. Thus, the 
pension challenge may be 'solved' but the care-related implications of ageing have yet to be 
effectively dealt with.  
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 ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Sweden has the fourth lowest infant mortality in the world in 2003 behind Iceland, Japan and 
Finland (Socialstyrelsen 2005: 33). 
2 Most Swedes only pay local income tax, which averages about 30 percent of taxable income. 
High income earners pay an additional 20 percent in state income tax. The municipalities and 
country councils share the local revenue. 
3 www.oecd.com. 
4 The size of the county council areas varies between 60,000 and 1.8 million people. 
5 The committee will present its final report in 2007.  
6 After three months the patient has the right to be treated elsewhere at the cost of his/her home 
county council. 
7 See Heclo (1974) and Baldwin (1990). 
8For discussions of the ATP reform, see Heclo (1974: 246). 
9This change was intended to help wage-earners between the ages of 60 and 64 in poor health or 
with physically taxing jobs. 
10The partial pension paid 65 percent of lost income without reducing the amount of pension 
points earned until retirement age.  
11 Sweden is known for its forward-looking investigative commissions that are often or usually 
appointed to study reform needs and propose policy change. 
12 Initially, the Left Party and the New Democracy Party participated in the negotiations but both 
quickly left the group, complaining that the committee's work was undemocratic. 
13 See Anderson and Immergut (2007) and Lundberg (2003) for the politics of the reform 
process. 
                                                                                                                                                              
14 All citizens were entitled to the basic pension while ATP provided benefits based on previous 
income from work. In addition, the partial pension (delpension) and disability pension 
(förtidspension) provided benefits for early retirees.  The relevant reports from official 
commissions of inquiry are Ds 1992: 89; DS 1995: 41; SOU 1994: 20; and SOU 1997: 131. 
15 The National Insurance Office (Försäkringskassan) took over this function from the National 
Social Insurance Board (Riksförsäkringsverket) in 2005. 
16 On the premium pension see Weaver (2003/04). 
17 The pension contribution is not pension-carrying, so 93 percent of 8.07 income base amounts 
is 7.5 income base amounts (100 percent - 7 percent fee = 93 percent). 
18 The amount of the pension credit is calculated according to the most favorable of three 
methods and goes to the mother unless the parents apply for the father to receive the credit.  One 
of the calculation methods is to award the pension credit for income equivalent to one ‘base 
amount,’ or euro 4,500.  Sixty percent of women are eligible for a higher credit (See RFV 
redovisar 1999: 12. Den nya allmänna pensionen).  
19 In the new system, AP Funds 1-4, and 7 are the buffer funds. In the old system, AP Funds 1-4, 
6, and 7 were the buffers.  
20 AP stands for ‘Allmänna pensionsfonderna’ or national pension funds that are part of the 
public pension system. There are currently seven AP Funds. 
21 Proposition 2005/06: 01. Ålderspensionssystemet vid sidan av statsbudgeten. 
22 In 2004, the balance ratio was 1.0014. Notional assets were SEK 5,607 billion, and financial 
assets in the AP Funds were SEK 646 billion, for a total of SEK 6263 billion in assets. Liabilities 
were SEK 6244 billion. 
23 The ceiling is 3.16 price base amounts for singles and 2.8275 price base amounts for spouses. 
                                                                                                                                                              
24 Those born earlier fall under the old system, so they received the old basic pension (and 
possibly supplements) until 2003, when a transitional guarantee pension was introduced for this 
particular group. The transitional guarantee pensions pays the same net amount as the old basic 
pension and pension supplements that the retired person was entitled to before 2003. 
25 For example, if the income index is 2.0, the economic adjustment index is 2.0-1.6 = 0.4. 1.6 
percent is deducted because the same percentage rate of return is applied to the notional annuity 
at retirement. Thus the annuity is front-loaded and this is compensated for afterwards by the 
construction of the economic adjustment index. 
26 On the premium pension, see R. Kent Weaver (2002/2003) and SOU (1997: 131). 
27 The calculation is proportional. For example, someone born in 1940 receives 13/16 of his/her 
pension from the old system and 3/16 from the new.  
28 Four sectoral pension schemes top up public benefits, covering about 90 percent of wage 
earners.  For most wage earners, these schemes add about 10 percent to public benefits. The 
amount is higher for higher income earners. 
29 In 1997, income inequality in Sweden was among the lowest in Western Europe (Jansson 
2000: 8) despite a slight increase in the 1990s.   
 
30 Conservatives, Center Party, Christian Democrats, and Liberals. 
